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Abstract—Today, debugging failed software upgrades is a long
and tedious activity, as developers may have to consider large
sections of code to locate the bug. We argue that failed upgrade
debugging can be simplified by exploiting the characteristics of
upgrade problems to prioritize the set of routines to consider. In
particular, previous work has shown that differences between the
computing environment in the developer’s and users’ sites cause
most upgrade problems. Based on this observation, we design
and implement Sahara, a system that identifies the aspects of the
environment that are most likely the culprits of the misbehavior,
finds the subset of routines that relate to those aspects, and selects
an even smaller subset of routines to debug first. To achieve its
goals, Sahara leverages feedback from a large number of user
sites, machine learning, and static and dynamic source analyses.
We evaluate Sahara for three real upgrade problems with the
OpenSSH suite, one synthetic problem with the SQLite database,
and one synthetic problem with the uServer Web server. Our
results show that the system produces accurate recommendations
comprising only a small number of routines.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern software systems are complex and comprise many
interacting and dependent components. Frequent upgrades
are required for some or all components to fix bugs, patch
security vulnerabilities, add or remove features, and other
critical tasks. Unfortunately, many of the upgrades either fail
or produce unwanted behavior. A survey conducted by Crameri
et al. [9] showed that 90% of system administrators perform
upgrades at least once a month, and that 5–10% of them
is problematic. Interestingly, they also found that the most
common source of upgrade problems is the difference between
the environment (i.e., version of operating system and libraries,
configuration settings, environment variables, hardware, etc)
at the developer’s site and the users’ sites. Such problems
are difficult (or maybe impossible) to prevent because the
developer cannot foresee, much less test her software for, every
possible environment in which the software might be used.
When upgrades misbehave at some user sites, the devel-
opers receive bug reports and complaints. In some cases, the
developers may also receive logs of failed executions and/or
core dumps. Developers often undergo several exchanges with
the users to gather all the pertinent information. Thereafter,
the developers examine the information to locate the likely
causes of the misbehavior. This process is long and tedious,
as developers may have to consider large chunks of code to
locate the root cause of the misbehavior.
In this paper, we propose Sahara, a system that simplifies the
debugging of environment-related upgrade problems by pin-
pointing the subset of routines and variables that is most likely
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the source of misbehavior. Sahara’s design was motivated by
two observations: (1) since the problem was caused by one or
more aspects of the user environment, it is critical to identify
these suspect aspects and their effects throughout the code;
and (2) since the previous version of the software behaved
properly, it is critical to identify the behavioral differences
between the previous and upgraded versions.
Given these observations, the root cause of an upgrade
problem is most likely to be in the code that is both (1)
affected by the suspect aspects of the environment and (2)
whose behavior has deviated after the upgrade. To isolate
this code, Sahara combines information collected from many
users of the software, machine learning techniques, static and
dynamic source analyses. The machine learning and the static
analysis run at the developer’s site, whereas the data collection
and dynamic analysis run at the users’ sites (for those users
who are willing to run Sahara). Sahara targets C applications
written for Unix-like operating systems.
In more detail, Sahara applies feature selection [35] on the
environment and upgrade success/failure information received
from users to rank the aspects of the environment that are most
likely to be the source of the misbehavior. Then, it uses def-
use static analysis [1] to identify the set of variables whose
values derive directly or indirectly from the suspect aspects.
The routines in which these variables are used become the
first set of potential culprits. At this point, Sahara deploys
instrumented versions of the current and upgraded version of
the code to the user sites that reported misbehaviors. It then
runs the instrumented versions automatically (and with the
same inputs) to collect information about all routine calls and
returns. Using this information, it uses value spectra [36] to
identify the set of routines that caused the behavior to deviate
from one execution to the other at each misbehaving site.
These sets of routines are also considered suspects. Finally,
Sahara intersects the sets of suspect routines resulting from the
static and dynamic analyses; those in the intersection should
be debugged first.
To evaluate Sahara, we study three real upgrade problems
with the OpenSSH suite, one synthetic problem in the SQLite
database engine, and one synthetic problem with the uServer
Web server. Our results demonstrate that Sahara produces
recommendations that always include the routines responsible
for the bugs. The exact number of recommended routines
depends on the characteristics of the information received from
users. In experiments where we varied these characteristics
widely, Sahara recommends 2–21 suspect routines that should
be debugged first. These numbers can be 20x smaller than
the number of routines affected by the upgrades. Compared to
static and dynamic analyses alone, Sahara reduces the numbers
1. int env2 = 0, glob = 3;
2.
3. int checklength(int len) {
4. if (len <= 9) % Upgrade changes sign to <
5. return len;
6. else
7. return -1;
8. }
9. int secondfunction(float a) {
10. int ai = ceil(a);
11. if ((glob + ai) < 5)
12. return 100;
13. else
14. return 10;
15. }
16. int main() {
17. char uname[80];
18. strcpy(uname, getenv("SHELL"));
19. env2 = strlen(uname);
20. int retval1 = checklength(env2);
21. if (retval1 > 0)
22. printf("Out1:%d",secondfunction(2.2));
23. else
24. printf("Out2:%d",secondfunction(5.1));
25. return 0;
26. }
Fig. 1. Example.
of suspect routines by 1.4x–6x and 14x–40x, respectively.
Given its accuracy and these large reductions, we expect that
Sahara can significantly reduce debugging time in practice.
II. SAHARA: PRIORITIZING UPGRADE DEBUGGING
A. A Motivating Example
To make our exposition more concrete, let us look at a
simple example in Fig 1. The example takes the name of
an environment variable as input using a call to getenv()
(line 18). It then checks if the length of the string is smaller
than or equal to 9 (line 4). Depending on the outcome of the
comparison, a different output is produced (lines 21–24).
Let us assume that the upgrade simply changes the sign
in line 4 from “<=” to “<”. This upgrade will fail at user
sites where the $SHELL variable is set to /bin/bash or
/bin/tcsh, but not /bin/csh or /bin/ksh, for instance.
More generally, the upgrade will fail where the length of
the value of the $SHELL environment variable is exactly 9.
However, the program ran successfully at these sites before the
upgrade. This upgrade failure is similar to the ProxyCommand
bug [28] that we detail in Section III-A.
The failure has two interesting characteristics. First, the
upgrade fails only at a subset of user sites, which may have
been the reason the bug went undetected during development.
Second, despite the fact that the two versions of the code
are input-compatible, the execution behavior changes with the
upgrade both in terms of the path executed and the output.
Given these characteristics, identifying the aspects of the
environment that correlate with the failure is a necessary first
step for efficiently diagnosing the failure. In this simple exam-
ple, the name of the shell is the aspect of the environment that
triggers the failure. It is also important to identify the variables
and routines in the code that are directly or indirectly affected
by the environment. Note that the name of the shell is initially
assigned to the uname array; only later does variable env2
become related to the environment. Thus, variables uname
and env2, as well as routines main and checklength are
suspect. However, identifying these suspects is not sufficient,
Fig. 2. Overview of Sahara.
because the program behaved correctly before the upgrade was
applied in the same environment. We also need to determine
how the upgraded version of the program has deviated in
behavior from the current version. This analysis would then
show that routine checklength and secondfunction
behave differently in the two versions, meaning that they are
also suspects. The root cause of the failure is most likely
to be contained in the code that is affected by both the
suspect environment and whose behavior has changed after the
upgrade, i.e. routine checklength. This routine is exactly
where the bug is.
B. Design and Implementation
Overview. Figure 2 illustrates the steps involved in Sahara.
First, Sahara deploys the upgrade to any users that request it
(step 1). As the software executes at each user’s site, Sahara
collects information about the environment and inputs used
(step 2). At the end of the execution, Sahara obscures and then
transfers the collected environment information (the inputs
are never transferred on the network) to the developer’s site,
along with a success/failure flag provided by the user (step
3). (Obviously, some users may decide not to allow any sort
of information to be collected or provided to Sahara.) The
information about the environment includes the version of the
operating system, the version of the libraries, the configuration
settings, the name and version of the other software packages
installed, and a description of the hardware. A failure flag may
mean that (a) the upgrade could not be properly installed or
executed, (b) the upgrade caused incorrect behavior or a crash,
or (c) the upgrade caused another software to misbehave [9].
Now suppose that the upgrade misbehaved at one user site at
least. With the environment and success/failure information at
the developer’s site, Sahara runs a machine learning algorithm
to determine the aspects of the environment that are most likely
to have caused the misbehavior (step 4). Next, based on def-
use static analysis, Sahara isolates the variables in the code that
derive directly or indirectly from those aspects; the routines
that use these variables are considered suspect (step 5).
Sahara then deploys instrumented versions of the current
and upgraded code to the user sites that reported failures (step
6). At each of those sites, Sahara executes both versions with
the inputs collected in step 2 and collects dynamic routine
call/return information (step 7). Sahara then compares the
logs from the two executions to determine the routines that
exhibited different dynamic behavior (step 8). This step is
done at the failed user sites to avoid transferring the potentially
large execution logs back to the developer’s site. Sahara then
transfers the list of routines that deviated at each failed user
site back to the developer’s site (step 9); the routines on these
lists are considered suspect as well.
Finally, Sahara intersects the suspects from the static and
dynamic analyses (step 10). It reports the intersection to the
developer as the routines to debug first. If the problem is not
found in this set, other suspect routines should be considered.
Next, we detail the implementation of these steps.
Upgrade deployment, tracing, and user feedback (steps
1–3). Upgrade deployment in Sahara is trivial. The upgraded
code is available via a Web interface and can be downloaded
as a package/patch by any user that wants it.
Sahara uses the Mirage tracing infrastructure, which has
been detailed in [3], [9]. Thus, next we only describe the
most important aspects of it. The infrastructure identifies the
“environmental resources” an application depends on and then
fingerprints (i.e., derives a compact representation for) them.
The following resources are considered as an application’s
environment: a) all files accessed read-only (such as config-
uration files) by the application; b) all files of a certain type
(such as libraries); c) all files in the package being upgraded.
Furthermore, Sahara provides an API that allows the developer
to include or exclude files or directories. In addition to the
data accessed during application execution, Sahara collects
information about the hardware and software installed.
Again as in Mirage, Sahara provides parsers to compute
a concise representation (fingerprint) for each environmental
resource. The parsers know how to extract relevant information
from a file based on its type and hash its content at a specific
granularity. For instance, the parsers for binary files generate
fingerprints at a coarser granularity than the parsers for a
configuration file. We use SHA-1 to compute fingerprints of
the resources. In each fingerprint, the name of the resource
serves as a key and the hash of its contents as the value.
For the users who choose to participate, Sahara sends the
tracing infrastructure and the parsers to their sites. During
the first several executions of the upgraded software (the
number of executions can be defined by the developer), Sahara
collects the environment resource information and produces
the fingerprints. After each of these executions, Sahara also
queries the user about whether the upgrade has succeeded or
failed. We ask for this success/failure flag, because it may be
difficult to determine failure in some cases. For example, a
software misbehavior is considered a failure, even if it does
not cause a crash or any other OS-visible event. In addition,
the upgrade may cause another software to misbehave [9].
When the user provides a succeed/fail flag, Sahara sends this
information, along with the environment resource fingerprints,
back to the developer’s site. This data represents the profile of
the corresponding user site. After the first several executions,
Sahara turns its data collection off to minimize overheads.
User profiles from all sites serve as the input to the feature
selection step. Section III systematically studies the impact of
user profiles with various characteristics.
Feature selection (step 4). Based on the information received
from the user sites, this step selects environment resources
(called features) with the strongest correlation to the observed
upgrade failures. The fingerprints are never “unhashed” during
feature selection (or after it); it is enough for Sahara to know
how many different fingerprints there are for each feature.
Sahara uses the decision tree algorithm with feature ranking
from the WEKA tool [www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/] for
selection. The algorithm builds a decision tree by first selecting
a feature to place at the root node, and creating a tree branch
for each possible value of the feature. This splits up the dataset
into subsets, one for each value of the feature. The choice of
the root feature is based on Gain Ratio [30], a measure of a
feature’s ability to create subsets with homogeneous classes.
In Sahara, there are only two classes: success or failure. The
Gain Ratio is higher for the features that create subsets with
mostly success or mostly failure user profiles. For instance, in
the example of Fig 1, the root feature would be the SHELL
environment variable. The subsets that include SHELL strings
of length different than 9 are successes, whereas those that
have strings of exactly 9 characters are failures.
After selecting the root feature, the process is repeated
recursively for each branch, using only those profiles that
actually reach the branch. When all the profiles at a node have
the same classification, the algorithm has completed that part
of the tree. The output of the algorithm is a set of features,
their Gain Ratios, and their ranks.
To validate the feature selection, Sahara uses 10-fold cross-
validation [16] to compute the standard deviation of the ranks
of each feature. When the standard deviations of the top-
ranked features are high, Sahara warns the developer that its
results are not to be trusted, i.e. the reason for the failures is
unlikely to be the environment. When this condition is not met,
Sahara considers all the features that have Gain Ratios within
30% of the highest ranked feature as Suspect Environment
Resources (SERs). These SERs serve as input to the static
analysis step. We assess the impact of the accuracy of the
feature selection step in Section III.
Static analysis and suspect routines (step 5). Sahara analyzes
the upgraded software using the C Intermediate Language
(CIL) [24]. Specifically, it implements two CIL modules, the
call-graph module and the def-use module. As the name
suggests, the call-graph module computes a whole-program
static call graph by traversing all the source files, a routine
at a time. Every node in the call graph is a routine, and its
children nodes are the routines it calls. The root of the call
graph is always the main() routine.
The def-use module creates def-use chains [1] for each SER.
A def-use chain links all the variables that derive directly
or indirectly from one SER. Each array is handled as a
single variable, whereas struct and union fields are handled
separately. Figure 3 shows the def-use chain (thin arrows) for
our example program.
Fig. 3. Def-use chain, suspect variables and routines for our simple example.
To find suspect routines, Sahara traverses all the routines in
the order they appear in the call graph, starting with the root.
During the course of the traversal, Sahara maintains three lists:
(1) a list of global suspect variables (SuspectVars); (2) a list
of per-routine suspect variables (LsuspectVars); and (3) a list
of routines that are suspect (SuspectRoutines). SuspectVars is
initialized with the variables corresponding to SERs.
Sahara analyzes each routine statement-by-statement, start-
ing with the root routine. For every variable access, it checks
whether the variable is a suspect or depends on any suspect, ei-
ther directly or indirectly. If so, the accessed variable becomes
a suspect. If it is a local variable, it is added to LsuspectVars
of the routine where the access appears; otherwise, it is added
to SuspectVars. The routine containing the access is added
to SuspectRoutines. In addition, if a routine calls another
with a suspect variable as a parameter, the caller is added
to SuspectRoutines and the corresponding formal parameter is
added to the LsuspectVars of the callee. The callee becomes
a suspect if the suspect parameter is used in the function, and
not otherwise. Furthermore, a routine becomes suspect if the
return value of any of its callees is suspect, and it is used in the
routine. Similarly, a routine becomes suspect if any parameter
passed by reference to one of its callees becomes suspect, and
it is used in the routine. This step outputs SuspectRoutines
(SRs), after the entire graph has been traversed.
This step produces a set of routines that are highly corre-
lated with the failures. For the example in Fig 1, main and
checklength are the two suspect routines. The block arrows
in Figure 3 show why these routines were included as suspects.
Creating and distributing instrumented versions (step 6).
After the SRs are identified, Sahara generates the instrumented
versions of the current and upgraded versions of the software.
Sahara uses CIL to automatically instrument the application.
The instrumentation is introduced by two new CIL modules,
instrument-calls and ptr-analysis. The instrument-calls module
inserts calls to our C runtime library to log routine signatures
for all the routines executed in a particular run. A routine’s
signature consists of the number, name, and values of its pa-
rameters, its return value, and any global state that is accessed
by the routine. The global state comprises the number, name,
and values of all the global variables accessed by the routine.
This module works well for logging parameters of basic data
types. However, in order to correctly log pointer variables and
1. Function main numArgs 0
2. Globals at ENTRY: 0
3. Function checklength numArgs 0
4. Globals at ENTRY: 1
5. Global: env2 Size: 4 Type: int Value: 9
6. Globals at EXIT: 1
7. Global: env2 Size: 4 Type: int Value: 9
8orig. Return: retVal Size: 4 Type: int Value: 9
8upg. Return: retVal Size: 4 Type: int Value: -1
9.
10. Function secondfunction numArgs 1
11. Globals at ENTRY: 1
12. Global: glob Size: 4 Type: int Value: 3
13orig. Param: a Size: 4 Type: float Value: 2.2
13upg. Param: a Size: 4 Type: float Value: 5.1
14. Globals at EXIT: 1
15. Global: glob Size: 4 Type: int Value: 3
16. Return: retVal Size: 4 Type: int Value: 10
17. Globals at EXIT: 0
18. Return: retVal Size: 4 Type: int Value: 0
Fig. 4. Execution log of two versions.
variables of complex data types, we have implemented the ptr-
analysis module. This module inserts additional calls to our C
library to track all heap allocations and deallocations.
Re-execution, value spectra analysis, and deviated routines
(steps 7-9). As we do not want to transfer inputs or large logs
across the network, these steps are performed at the failed
users’ sites themselves. To do so, Sahara first deploys infras-
tructure to those sites that is responsible for re-execution and
dynamic analysis. It then transfers the instrumented binaries
of the current and upgraded versions.
Sahara leverages Mirage’s re-execution infrastructure,
which has been detailed in [9]. This infrastructure executes the
instrumented binaries of both versions at the failed user sites,
feeding them the same inputs that had caused the upgrade to
fail. These inputs were collected in the logs recorded during
step 2. To allow for some level of non-determinism during re-
execution, Sahara maps the recorded inputs to the appropriate
input operations (identified by their system calls and thread
ids), even if they are executed in a different order in the log.
As the instrumented versions execute, their dynamic routine
call/return information is collected. Fig 4 shows the log for the
two versions. Since the logs of the two versions are mostly
same (except for lines 8 and 15), only the lines that are
different between the two versions are duplicated.
With these logs, Sahara determines the set of routines, called
DeviatedRoutines (DRs), whose behavior has deviated after the
upgrade. Specifically, we implement fDiff, a tool that converts
each of log into a sequence of routine signatures, and uses
the longest common subsequence algorithm to compute the
difference between the sequences. FDiff is similar to Unix’s
diff, but produces more concise output as it understands the
call/return structure of our logs. A routine has deviated, if the
following differs between the two versions: (1) its number of
arguments; (2) the value of any of its arguments; (3) its return
value; (4) the number of global variables it accesses; or (5) the
value of one or more global variables it accesses. This notion
of deviation is similar to that of value spectra [36]. Wilde and
Scully [34] also compare execution logs.
In Fig 4, two routines have deviated: checklength has
deviated in its return value (line 8), whereas secondfuncti-
on has deviated in its argument (line 13).
Sahara transfers the DRs list to the developer’s site.
Intersection and list of primary suspects (step 10). Finally,
Sahara computes the union of the DRs from the failed user
sites. It then intersects this larger set with the SRs, thereby
eliminating benign deviations that have nothing to do with
the failure. The intersection forms the set of Prime Suspect
Routines (PSRs), i.e. the routines most likely to contain the
root cause of the failure. For the example, checklength is
the prime suspect, despite the fact that all 3 routines have
some relationship to the users’ environment. The root cause
is indeed checklength.
C. Discussion
Sahara and other systems. Sahara simplifies the debugging
of upgrades that fail due to the user environment. As such,
Sahara is less comprehensive than systems that seek to identify
more classes of software bugs (e.g., [32]). However, Sahara
takes advantage of its narrower scope to guide failed upgrade
debugging more directly towards environment-related bugs
(which are the most common in practice [9]).
In essence, we see Sahara as complementary to other
systems. In fact, an example combination of systems is the
following. Steps 1–4 of Sahara would be executed first. If
the user environment is likely the culprit (as determined by
the output of step 4), the other steps are executed. Otherwise,
another system is activated.
Dealing with multiple bugs. The feature selection algorithm
is the only part of Sahara that could be negatively affected
by an upgrade with multiple bugs. The other components
of Sahara are unaffected because (1) information about each
execution (the resource fingerprints and a success/failure flag)
represents at most one bug, (2) static analysis is independent of
the number of bugs, (3) each dynamic analysis finds deviations
associated with a single bug, and (4) the union+intersection
step is independent of the number of bugs.
Sahara is effective when faced with multiple bugs, even
when feature selection does not produce the ideal results. To
understand this, consider the two possible scenarios: (1) all
bugs are environment-related; and (2) one or more bugs are
unrelated to the environment.
When all bugs are environment-related and involve the same
environment resources, feature selection works correctly and
Sahara easily produces the prime suspects for all bugs. If
different bugs relate to different sets of environment resources,
feature selection could misbehave. In particular, if there is not
enough information about all bugs, feature selection could mis-
rank the environment resources that are relevant to the less
frequent bugs to the point that they do not become SERs.
This would cause the remaining steps to eventually produce
the prime suspects for the more frequent bugs only. After
those bugs are removed, Sahara can be run again to tackle the
less frequent bugs. This second time, feature selection would
rank the environment resources of the remaining bugs more
highly. Other systems rely on similar multi-round approaches
for dealing with multiple bugs, e.g. [12].
When one or more bugs are not related to the environment,
feature selection could again misbehave if there is not enough
information about the bugs that are environment-related. This
scenario would most likely cause feature selection to low-
rank all environment resources. In this case, the best approach
is to resort to a different system, as discussed above. In
contrast, if there is enough information about the environment-
related bugs, feature selection would select the proper SERs.
Despite this good behavior, the dynamic analysis at some
failed sites would identify DRs corresponding to bugs that are
not related to the environment. However, those routines would
not intersect with those from the static analysis, leading to the
proper prime suspect results.
Limitations of Sahara’s current implementation. Sahara
currently implements simple versions of its components. As
a proof-of-concept, the goal of this initial implementation is
simply to demonstrate how to combine different techniques in
a useful and novel way. However, as we discuss below, more
sophisticated components can easily replace the existing ones.
Sahara limits the user information transferred to the de-
veloper’s site to the resource fingerprints. In our current
implementation, the fingerprints are transferred in hashed form
(SHA-1), which does not provide foolproof privacy guarantees.
However, Sahara can easily use more sophisticated schemes
for these transfers. Regardless of the privacy scheme, the
bandwidth required by these transfers (and that of the DRs)
should be negligible. Sahara requires more bandwidth for
transferring the re-execution and value spectra infrastructures,
but only for failed user sites.
Sahara employs static and dynamic analyses to narrow the
set of routines that are likely to contain the root cause of
the failure. However, under certain conditions, these analyses
may be unable to do so. In the worst case, all routines may
be affected by the SERs, making static analysis ineffective.
Similarly, all routines could be found to deviate from their
original behaviors. Fortunately, these worst-case scenarios are
extremely unlikely in a single upgrade.
Execution replay at the failed sites is currently performed
without virtualization. Using virtual machines would enable us
to automatically handle applications that have side-effects, but
at the cost of becoming more intrusive and transferring more
data to the failed sites. Sahara can be extended to use replay
virtualization. On the positive side, Sahara performs a single
replay at a failed site, which is significantly more efficient than
the many replays of techniques such as delta debugging [39].
Our current approach for handling replay non-determinism
is very simple: Sahara tries to match the recorded inputs to
their original system calls when re-executing each version of
the application. Internal non-determinism (e.g., due to random
numbers or race conditions) is currently not handled and may
mislead the dynamic analysis if it changes: the number or
value of the arguments passed to any routines, the number
or value of the global variables they touch, or their return
values. Sahara can be combined with existing deterministic
replay systems to eliminate these problems.
Finally, Sahara guides the debugging process by pinpointing
a set of routines to debug first. Pinpointing a single routine
or a single line causing the failure may not even be possible,
since the root cause of the failure may span multiple lines and
routines. Moreover, the systems that attempt such pinpointing
(e.g., [17], [32], [39]) often incur substantial overhead at the
users’ sites, such as running instrumented code all the time,
checkpointing state at regular intervals, and multiple replays.
III. EVALUATION
In this section, we describe our methodology and evaluate
Sahara by analyzing three real bugs in OpenSSH, a synthetic
bug in SQLite, and a synthetic bug in uServer.
We chose OpenSSH because it is widely deployed in diverse
user environments. Its upgrades are fairly frequent, typically
once every 3–6 months [26]. OpenSSH comprises many
components: (1) sshd, the daemon that listens for connections
coming from clients; (2) ssh, the client that logs and executes
commands on a remote machine; (3) scp, the program to copy
files between hosts; (4) sftp, an interactive file transfer program
atop the SSH transport; and (5) utilities such as ssh-add, ssh-
agent, ssh-keysign, ssh-keyscan, ssh-keygen, and sftp-server. In
all, OpenSSH has around 400 distinct files and 50–70K lines
of code (LOC).
SQLite is the most widely deployed SQL database [31]. It
implements a serverless, transactional SQL engine. SQLite has
67K LOC spread across 4 files. uServer [7] is an open-source,
event-driven Web server sometimes used for performance
studies. It has 37K LOC spread across 161 files.
A. Methodology
OpenSSH: Port forwarding bug. Port forwarding is com-
monly used to create a SSH tunnel. To setup a tunnel, one
forwards a specified local port to a port on the remote machine.
SSH tunnels provide a means to bypass firewalls, so long as the
site allows outgoing connections. The bug [5] was a regression
bug in OpenSSH version 4.7. When using SSH port forwarding
for large transfers, the transfer aborts. Some users observed the
following buffer error:
buffer_get_string_ret: bad string length 557056
buffer_get_string: buffer error
These transfers executed successfully until version 4.6, but
the behavior changed after upgrading to version 4.7. The
failure was observed at a small subset of user sites. The abort
was not reproducible at the developer’s site, so the developer
needed volunteer users to reproduce the bug and test its fix.
A correct and complete fix was submitted and tested by the
users on the second attempt after almost three months from
the time it was submitted [5].
The failure was caused by the following issues: (a) the
users had enabled port forwarding in the ssh configuration
file; (b) change in default window size from 128KB to 2MB
in the ssh client code in version 4.7; (c) port forwarding code
advertising the default window size as the default packet size;
and (d) the maximum packet size set to 256KB in sshd. Given
these characteristics, when users issued large transfers through
the ssh tunnel, some of the packets had size larger than the
daemon’s maximum, resulting in the buffer error after the
upgrade. The port forwarding code using the default window
size as the default packet size was not an issue before the
upgrade, as the size was always below the maximum.
OpenSSH: X11 forwarding bug. This bug [4] manifested
when users upgraded to OpenSSH version 4.2p1 from 4.1p1
and tried to start X11 forwarding. The following error was
observed at the sites that had SSH forwarding support enabled
and the command was executed in the background:
xterm Xt error: Can’t open display: localhost:10.0
In version 4.2p1, developers modified the X11 forwarding
code to fix some X11 channel leaks, including destroying the
X11 sessions whose session has ended. As a result, when the
X11 forwarding process is started in the background, the child
(and the channel) starting it would exit immediately. It took
the developers more than two weeks to fix this bug [4].
OpenSSH: ProxyCommand bug. The ProxyCommand op-
tion specifies the command that will be used by the SSH client
to connect to the remote server. The bug [28] was a regression
in OpenSSH version 4.9; ssh with ProxyCommand would fail
for some users with a "No such file" error.
Until version 4.7, ProxyCommand would use /bin/sh to
execute the command. However, in version 4.9, the code
changed to use the $SHELL environment variable, causing the
command to fail at user sites where $SHELL was set to an
empty string. The developers fixed this bug in one week, after
one user had already done a large amount of debugging [28].
SQLite and uServer bugs. To demonstrate Sahara’s general-
ity, we synthetically created one buggy upgrade for SQLite
version 3.6.14.2 and one for uServer version 0.6.0. Note
that these two bugs are trivial and could be identified by
simpler tools than Sahara. However, our goal is simply to
demonstrate that Sahara works without modification for a
variety of applications.
Before the upgrade of SQLite, the option echo on caused
its shell to output each command before executing it. After
our synthetic upgrade, it does not output the command when
executing in interactive mode. The bug we inject into the
upgrade of uServer is not environment-related. The bug is a
typo in the function that parses user input causing dropped
requests and occasional crashes.
We do not present complete results for the ProxyCommand,
SQLite, or uServer bugs due to space limitations. However, we
do include a summary of their results in the next subsection.
Upgrade deployment. To simulate a real-world deployment of
a software upgrade to users with varied environment settings,
we collected environment data from 87 machines at our site
across two clusters. The settings of the machines within a
cluster are similar, but differ across clusters.
We used the methodology described in Section II-B to
identify the environmental resources in OpenSSH, SQLite, and
uServer. Sahara uses the following parsers to parse and finger-
print the environmental resources: CHUNKS and CHUNKS2
chunk and fingerprint the binary files, such as the kernel
symbols; KEYVAL parses and chunks any file in the key-
delimiter-value format, such as shell environment or cpu data;
LIBS chunks and fingerprints all the libraries; LINES parses
and fingerprints a file one line at a time, such as the file
containing the list of kernel modules; and SSH and SSHD
are application-specific parsers to parse and fingerprint the
ssh config and sshd config configuration files, respectively.
It took us only 8 person-hours to implement these parsers.
SQLite and uServer did not require any application-specific
parsers. The environmental resources of a single machine,
parsed/chunked and fingerprinted, along with the success/fail-
ure flag constitute a single user profile.
By default, our experiments assume that 20 profiles include
environment settings that can activate a bug, whereas 67 of
them do not. We study the impact of this parameter below.
User site environments. To evaluate Sahara’s behavior in the
face of the uncertainties that may occur in practice, we per-
form six types of experiments: random perfect (rand p), two
random imperfect (rand i60 and rand i20), real configuration
perfect (real p), and two real configuration imperfect (real i60
and real i20). In the rand p experiment, the values of all the
environment resources related to the application are chosen at
random, except for the resources that relate directly to the bug.
Moreover, the 20 profiles with environment settings that can
activate the bug are classified as failed profiles, whereas the
other 67 are classified as successful ones. As a result, there
is 100% correlation between those resources and the failure.
This is the best case for feature selection in Sahara, as it finds
the minimum set of SERs.
In the two rand i cases, the environment settings are the
same as in the rand p case. However, not all profiles with
environment settings that cause the failure are labeled as
failures. In particular, only 60% of these profiles are labeled
failures in the rand i60 case, and only 20% in the rand i20
case. These imperfect experiments mimic the situation where
some users simply have not activated the bug yet, possibly
because they have not exercised the part of the code that uses
the problematic settings. These scenarios may lead feature
selection to pick more SERs than in the rand p case.
In the three types of experiments above, the application-
related environment includes random values. For more realistic
scenarios, we downloaded eight different complete OpenSSH
configuration files from the Web. For each of the bugs, we
modify three of these files to include the settings that activate
the bug. One of these eight configuration files (three with
problematic settings and five with only good settings) is
assigned to each of the 87 user profiles randomly, but in the
same proportion as before: 20 users should get problematic
settings and 67 should not. In the real p case, all the 20
profiles with problematic settings are labeled as failures,
whereas the 67 others are labeled as successful. In the real i60
and real i20 experiments, only 60% and 20% of the profiles
with these settings are labeled as failures, respectively. The
real configurations are likely to lead to more SERs than the
random ones. We do not study real configurations for SQLite
and uServer because we inject synthetic bugs into them.
In all of our experiments, we consider the features ranked
within 30% of the highest ranked feature as suspects. In
addition, we use inputs that we know will activate the bugs.
B. Results
OpenSSH: Port forwarding bug. Recall that this bug was
introduced in the ssh code by version 4.7. This version has
58K LOC and 1529 routines (729 routines in ssh). The diff
between versions 4.6 and 4.7 comprises approximately 400
Bug Experiment diff SERs SRs DRs PSRs
Port
rand p 65 1 12 124 6
rand i60 65 1 12 124 6
rand i20 65 1 12 124 6
real p 65 3 22 124 7
real i60 65 3 22 124 7
real i20 65 3 22 124 7
X11
rand p 137 1 18 157 6
rand i60 137 1 18 157 6
rand i20 137 1 18 157 6
real p 137 3 21 157 7
real i60 137 3 20 157 6
real i20 137 3 20 157 6
TABLE I
OPENSSH BUG RESULTS. SERS = SUSPECT ENVIRONMENT
RESOURCES; SRS = SUSPECTROUTINES; DRS = DEVIATEDROUTINES;
PSRS = PRIME SUSPECT ROUTINES.
LOC and 65 routines. Sahara identified 101 environmental
resources, including the parameters in the configuration files,
the operating system and library dependencies, hardware data,
and other relevant files. Many of these resources, such as
library files, are split into smaller chunks; for others, such
as configuration files, each parameter is considered a separate
feature. Overall, there are 325 features, forming the input to
the feature selection step.
Table I shows the results for each of the analyses in
Sahara and all techniques combined for every experiment. The
feature selection step results in merely 1 feature chosen as
suspect in the rand p, rand i60, and rand i20 cases. In these
experiments, the environment resource that is actually determi-
nant in the failures, configuration parameter Tunnel, was the
only suspect because the other environmental resources were
assigned random values in all user profiles. This resulted in
a very high correlation between the failure and this resource,
even in the random imperfect cases. Tunnel corresponds to 4
suspect variables in ssh.
In contrast, in the real p, real i60 and real i20 experiments,
3 features are selected: configuration parameters Tunnel,
BatchMode, and RSAAuthentication. Features BatchMode
and RSAAuthentication have 3 possible values: yes, no, or
missing. In the real configurations we collected, it so happened
that RSAAuthentication was set to yes, and BatchMode to
no in two of the three failed profiles, causing them to be
highly correlated with the failure. Recall that we did not assign
these values; we retrieved the configurations from the Web and
changed only the setting of the Tunnel parameter. These three
parameters correspond to 8 suspect variables in ssh.
The static analysis results in 12 suspect routines in the
random cases, and 22 in the real cases. The 12 routines
comprise those that (1) read the configuration file and initialize
the environment of the ssh client; (2) create, enable, or disable
a tunnel; (3) place the tunnel data into a buffer or a packet;
and (4) enable the port forwarding over this tunnel and create
a channel for it. Routine channel new from the latter group
contains the root cause of this failure.
In the real cases, the same 12 routines are suspect, in
addition to those affected by RSAAuthentication. BatchMode
is used only during the initialization in ssh, so it does not
produce other suspects.
The dynamic analysis identifies 124 routines whose behav-
ior has deviated when going from version 4.6 to 4.7. Note
that the number of deviations is higher than the number of
routines that actually changed. The reason is that the command
succeeds before the upgrade and many more routines are
invoked, as compared to after the upgrade when the command
fails. In our fDiff implementation, the routines that were not
called after the upgrade are considered deviations.
The intersection of SRs and DRs is only 6 routines in
the random cases and 7 routines in the real cases. In the
random cases, the four routines pertaining to reading the
configuration file and setting up the environment, and two
routines pertaining to enabling or disabling the tunnel, were
pruned out after intersection; their behavior did not change
after the upgrade. In the real perfect case, confirm was the
additional routine identified as primary suspect. The 6 or 7
primary suspects reported by Sahara include the actual culprit
(routine channel new).
From the top six rows in Table I, we can see that the number
of primary suspects output by Sahara is 2x–3x lower than
that by static analysis, 17x–20x lower than that by dynamic
analysis, and 9x–10x lower than the number of routines that
were modified in the upgrade. Furthermore, we can see that
Sahara is resilient to users that do not report their upgrades
to have failed despite having problematic settings for the
environment resources that cause the failure.
OpenSSH: X11 forwarding bug. Recall that the X11 for-
warding bug affected the sshd program of OpenSSH version
4.2. This version has 52K LOC and 1439 routines (856
routines in sshd). The diff between versions 4.1 and 4.2
is approximately 900 LOC and 137 routines. Sahara identified
123 environmental resources, resulting in 354 features.
The bottom-half of Table I presents the results. The feature
selection step again results in 1 feature chosen as suspect in the
rand p, rand i60, and rand i20 cases. This feature is exactly
the environment resource that is directly related to the bug:
configuration parameter X11Forwarding. It corresponds to 3
variables in the sshd code.
In the real p experiment, Sahara selects 3 features: configu-
ration parameters X11Forwarding, AuthorizedKeysFile,
and ChallengeResponseAuthentication. In the real i60
and real i20 cases, Sahara also selects 3 features: configu-
ration parameters X11Forwarding, AuthorizedKeysFile,
and PidFile. AuthorizedKeysFile and PidFile were assigned
the default value in two out of the three failed real user
profiles, whereas ChallengeResponseAuthentication was set to
no value in two of them. These 4 features correspond to 7
actual variables in sshd.
The static analysis results in 18 suspect routines in the
rand p and rand i cases, 21 in real p, and 20 in the real i
cases. The 18 routines comprise those that: (1) read the
configuration file and initialize the environment of sshd; (2)
authenticate the incoming client connection with the options
specified and setup the connection; (3) start a packet for
X11 forwarding; and (4) setup X11 forwarding, create the
channel, process X11 requests, and do the cleanup. Routine
session setup x11fwd from the latter group is the culprit.
In the real configuration cases, all the 18 routines mentioned
above are suspect, in addition to those affected by Autho-
rizedKeysFile and ChallengeResponseAuthentication. PidFile
did not result in additional suspect routines, because it is used
once in the initialization to store the pid of sshd, and never
again. As a result, the real p case has 1 more routine reported
as suspect than the two real i cases.
The dynamic analysis identifies 157 routines whose behav-
ior has deviated when going from version 4.1 to 4.2. Again, the
number of deviations is higher than the number of modified
routines, because the upgraded code fails much earlier than
the original one.
The intersection of the two analyses results in only 6
routines in the random case, and 7 in the real configuration
cases. 3 of the 6 (or 7) primary suspect routines are key to
understanding the failure. However, the single modification
in the upgrade that directly causes the failure is in the
session setup x11fwd routine.
From these results, we can see that the number of primary
suspects found by Sahara is at least 3x lower than when
using static analysis alone, at least 20x lower than when
using dynamic analysis alone, and 15x lower than the number
of routines that were actually modified. Again, these results
illustrate Sahara’s ability to focus the debugging of failed
upgrades on a small number of routines, even when many
users do not experience failures despite having environment
resources that could trigger bugs in the upgrade.
Impact of number of profiles with failure-inducing set-
tings. So far, we have studied the impact of imperfections in
the categorization of success/failure of the upgrades on the
behavior of Sahara. Another key factor for the effectiveness
of feature selection is the percentage of user profiles that
actually include the environment resource settings that cause
the upgrade failures. On one hand, the lower this percentage,
the less information we have about the failures and, thus, the
worse the feature selection results should be. On the other
hand, lowering this percentage reduces noise (i.e., supporting
evidence for resources that are not related to the failures)
in the dataset and may lead to better selection results. To
confirm these observations, we performed some experiments in
which we varied the number of such profiles. In particular, we
considered cases in which 30 or 10 profiles (out of 87) had the
failure-inducing settings. Recall that our default results above
assumed 20 such profiles.
Table II presents the “perfect” results from these experi-
ments. The default results (rand p and real p) and the dynamic
analysis results are included for clarity. As expected, the
number of SERs (as well as suspect routines and primary
suspects) tends to increase when we lower the number of
profiles with failure-inducing settings. Interestingly, the real
configuration results for the X11 forwarding bug show that
lowering noise (going from real p to real 10) can indeed
improve results as well.
Impact of feature selection accuracy. Our longer technical
report [3] also includes a study of the impact of feature
selection accuracy on Sahara. In short, these results illustrate
the behavior we expected: the less accurate feature selection
Bug Experiment SERs SRs DRs PSRs
Port
rand p 30 1 12 124 6
rand p 1 12 124 6
rand 10 1 12 124 6
real 30 1 12 124 6
real p 3 22 124 7
real 10 3 22 124 7
X11
rand p 30 1 18 157 6
rand p 1 18 157 6
rand 10 1 18 157 6
real 30 1 18 157 6
real p 3 21 157 7
real 10 2 20 157 6
TABLE II
IMPACT OF #PROFILES WITH FAILURE-INDUCING SETTINGS. SERS
= SUSPECT ENVIRONMENT RESOURCES; SRS = SUSPECTROUTINES; DRS
= DEVIATEDROUTINES; PSRS = PRIME SUSPECT ROUTINES.
is, the more prime suspects Sahara finds. Defining a few more
SERs than necessary does not increase the number of prime
suspects excessively (roughly by 2x at most, in comparison to
our default results). However, adding too many unnecessary
SERs can increase the number of PSRs by 6x–7x.
OpenSSH: ProxyCommand bug. This bug affected ssh in
version 4.9, which comprises 58K LOC and 1535 routines
(712 routines in ssh). The upgrade to this version modified
122 routines. We performed the same 10 experiments with
this upgrade as above. Depending on the type of experiment,
feature selection produces 2–5 SERs and static analysis pro-
duces 10–29 suspect routines. Dynamic analysis produces 284
deviated routines. In contrast, Sahara outputs 7 or 11 PSRs in
all but one experiment (real 10, for which it recommends 21
routines). Overall, Sahara improves on static analysis by 1.4x
and on dynamic analysis by 14x–40x for this bug.
SQLite bug. We injected this bug in SQLite version 3.6.14.2,
which comprises 67K LOC and 1338 routines. The upgrade
modified two routines. We ran only the random family of
experiments, since this was not a real upgrade bug. These
results show that feature selection identified 2–3 SERs, static
analysis produced 12–13 SRs, and dynamic analysis identified
14 DRs. Sahara outputs 2 PSRs in each of the three random
cases (exactly the routines that were modified); one of the
PSRs is the root cause of the failure. Again, although trivial,
these experiments illustrate that Sahara can be used without
modification for a variety of applications.
uServer bug. We injected this bug in uServer version 0.6.0,
which comprises 37K LOC and 404 routines. The upgrade
modified 10 routines. Again, we ran only the random family
of experiments, since this was not a real upgrade bug. The
experiments stopped at the feature selection step, since the
ranks of the top-ranked features consistently exhibit high
standard deviations. Thus, feature selection properly flags this
bug as unrelated to the environment.
Summary. The Sahara results for the five bugs and the
different imperfections we studied suggest that our system may
significantly reduce the time and effort required to diagnose
the root cause of upgrade failures.
IV. RELATED WORK
A. Upgrade Deployment and Testing
A few studies [9], [21], [22] have proposed automated
upgrade deployment and testing techniques. McCamant and
Ernst [21], [22] automatically identify incompatibilities when
upgrading a component in a multi-component system. How-
ever, they did not attempt to isolate the root cause of the
incompatibilities. Similarly, Crameri et al. [9] did not seek
to determine the root cause of upgrade failures.
B. Automated Debugging
Troubleshooting misconfigurations. PeerPressure [33],
Snitch [23], and ConfAid [2] seek to identify the root cause
of software misconfigurations. These systems assume that the
software is correct, but was misconfigured by users. Sahara is
fundamentally different; it helps find upgrade bugs triggered
by proper configurations and environments. Moreover, Sahara
goes well beyond finding the environment resources most
likely to be related to a bug (i.e., feature selection).
Qin et al. [29] observe that many bugs are correlated with
the “execution environment” (which they define to include
configurations and the behavior of the operating and runtime
systems). Based on this observation, they propose Rx, a system
that tries to survive bugs at run time by dynamically changing
the execution environment. A follow-up to Rx, Triage [32]
goes further by dynamically changing the execution environ-
ment while attempting to diagnose failures at users’ sites.
Sahara focuses on upgrade bugs or misbehavior, rather than
software bugs in general as Rx and Triage do. For this reason,
Sahara can be much more specific about which variables
and routines should be considered first during debugging.
Moreover, Sahara can handle bugs due to aspects of the
environment that would be difficult (or impossible) to change
without semantic knowledge of the application. Finally, Rx
and Triage do not leverage data from many users, machine
learning, or static analysis. Using any of these features could
speed up Triage’s diagnosis. In fact, as we argue in Section
II-C, Sahara is complementary to systems like Triage.
Statistical debugging with user site feedback. Several pre-
vious papers [8], [12], [18], [19], [20], [27], [39] rely on low-
overhead, privacy-preserving instrumentation infrastructures to
provide user execution data back to developers. These works
do not consider the users’ environment, and require users to
constantly run instrumented code and send feedback back to
the developers, both of which have overheads.
Sahara also relies on information gathered at user sites, but
the data collection only lasts temporarily to lower overheads.
In addition, Sahara restricts its statistical analysis (feature
selection) to the aspects of the environment that may have
caused an upgrade to misbehave. Finally, Sahara goes further
by relating the results of the analysis to the variables and
routines that most likely caused the misbehavior.
Delta debugging. Delta debugging aims to resolve regression
faults automatically and effectively. Several studies [8], [15],
[39] have focused on comparing program states of failed and
successful runs to identify the space of variables or rank
program statements that are correlated with the failure.
Sahara’s dynamic analysis also considers the difference
between two runs of a program. However, our approach is
driven by environment resources and combines information
from a collection of users, machine learning, static analysis,
and dynamic analysis. Furthermore, unlike delta debugging,
Sahara requires neither instrumenting the production code nor
replaying the execution multiple times at the users’ sites.
Dynamic behavior deviations. Xie and Notkin [36] proposed
program spectra to compare versions and get insights into
their internal behavior. Harrold et al. [14] found that the
deviations between spectra of two versions frequently correlate
with regression faults.
Sahara uses value spectra to compare the execution call
traces from before and after the upgrade is applied. However,
merely identifying the deviations in the upgraded version
leads to a large number of candidates for exploration, as
our experiments demonstrate. The same is likely to occur
for most large applications or major upgrades. Sahara further
narrows down the deviation sources by cross-referencing them
with suspect routines found through information from users,
machine learning, and static analysis.
In [25], [38], the authors propose a search algorithm to
isolate the fault-inducing change after a regression test fails
at the developer’s site. In contrast, Sahara assumes that the
upgrade has been tested thoroughly at the developer’s site
and is deployed after all tests have passed. Sahara helps
isolate the fault-inducing code that is affected by specific user
environments. These failures are not easily reproducible at the
developer’s site because of environmental differences.
Other approaches. Researchers have actively been consider-
ing other approaches to automated debugging, e.g. [6], [10],
[11], [13], [37]. Sahara is not closely related to any of these
approaches, except peripherally for its use of static (def-use) or
dynamic analysis. However, Sahara’s use of static and dynamic
analyses differs in a major way from most other approaches: it
does not use them to find the bugs themselves; rather, it uses
them to constrain the set of routines of interest.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we sought to reduce the effort developers
must spend to debug failed upgrades. We proposed Sahara,
a system that prioritizes the set of routines to consider when
debugging. Driven by the fact that most upgrade failures
result from differences between the developers’ and users’
environments, Sahara combines information from user site
executions and environments, machine learning, and static
and dynamic analyses. We evaluated our system for five
bugs in three widely used applications. Our results showed
that Sahara produces accurate recommendations with only a
small set of routines. Importantly, the set of recommended
routines remains small and accurate, even when the user site
information is misleading or limited.
REFERENCES
[1] AHO, A. V., SETHI, R., AND ULLMAN, J. D. Compilers: Principles,
Practices and Techniques. Addison-Wesley, 1986.
[2] ATTARIYAN, M., AND FLINN, J. Automating Configuration Trou-
bleshooting With Dynamic Information Flow Analysis. In OSDI (2010).
[3] BACHWANI, R., ET AL. Sahara: Guiding the Debugging of Failed
Software Upgrades. Tech. Rep. DCS-TR-676, Dept. of Computer
Science, Rutgers University, October 2010, Revised January 2011.
[4] X forwarding will not start when a command is executed in background.
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show bug.cgi?id=1086.
[5] Connection aborted on large data -R transfer.
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show bug.cgi?id=1360.
[6] CADAR, C., DUNBAR, D., AND ENGLER, D. KLEE: Unassisted and
Automatic Generation of High-Coverage Tests for Complex Systems
Programs. In OSDI (2008).
[7] CHANDRA, A., AND MOSBERGER, D. Scalability of Linux Event-
Dispatch Mechanisms. In USENIX ATC (2001).
[8] CLEVE, H., AND ZELLER, A. Locating Causes of Program Failures. In
ICSE (2005).
[9] CRAMERI, O., ET AL.
[10] ENGLER, D., ET AL. Bugs as Deviant Behavior: A General Approach
to Inferring Errors in Systems Code. In SOSP (2001).
[11] ERNST, M., ET AL. Dynamically Discovering Likely Program Invariants
to Support Program Evolution. In ICSE (1999).
[12] GLERUM, K., ET AL. Debugging in the (Very) Large: Ten Years of
Implementation and Experience. In SOSP (2009).
[13] HANGAL, S., AND LAM, M. Tracking Down Software Bugs Using
Automatic Anomaly Detection. In ICSE (2002).
[14] HARROLD, M. J., ET AL. An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship
Between Spectra Differences and Regression Faults. Journal of Software
Testing, Verification and Reliability (2000).
[15] JEFFREY, D., GUPTA, N., AND GUPTA, R. Fault Localization Using
Value Replacement. In ISSTA (2008).
[16] KOHAVI, R. A Study of Cross-Validation and Bootstrap for Accuracy
Estimation and Model Selection. In IJCAI (1995).
[17] LIBLIT, B. Cooperative Bug Isolation. PhD thesis, University of
California, Berkeley, 2004.
[18] LIBLIT, B., ET AL. Bug Isolation via Remote Program Sampling. In
PLDI (2003).
[19] LIBLIT, B., ET AL. Scalable Statistical Bug Isolation. In PLDI (2005).
[20] LIU, C., ET AL. SOBER: Statistical Model-based Bug Localization.
ESEC (2005).
[21] MCCAMANT, S., AND ERNST, M. Predicting Problems Caused by
Component Upgrades. In ESEC (2003).
[22] MCCAMANT, S., AND ERNST, M. Early Identification of Incompatibil-
ities in Multi-component Upgrades. In ECOOP (2004).
[23] MICKENS, J., SZUMMER, M., AND NARAYANAN, D. Snitch: Interactive
Decision Trees for Troubleshooting Misconfigurations. In SysML (2007).
[24] NECULA, G., ET AL. CIL: Intermediate Language and Tools for
Analysis and Transformation of C Programs. In CC (2002).
[25] NESS, B., AND NGO, V. Regression Containment through Source
Change Isolation. In COMPSAC (1997).
[26] OpenSSH release dates. http://openbsd.mirrors.hoobly.com/OpenSSH/-
portable.
[27] ORSO, A., ET AL. Gamma System: Continuous Evolution of Software
After Deployment. In ISSTA (2002).
[28] ProxyCommand not working if $SHELL not defined.
http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=125268210501780&w=2.
[29] QIN, F., ET AL. Rx: Treating Bugs as Allergies - A Safe Method to
Survive Software Failures. In SOSP (2005).
[30] QUINLAN, J. R. Induction of Decision Trees. Machine Learning (1986).
[31] SQLite home page. http://www.sqlite.org/.
[32] TUCEK, J., ET AL. Triage: Diagnosing Production Run Failures at the
User’s Site. In SOSP (2007).
[33] WANG, H. J., ET AL. Automatic Misconfiguration Troubleshooting with
PeerPressure. In OSDI (2004).
[34] WILDE, N., AND SCULLY, M. Software Reconnaissance: Mapping
Program Features to Code. Journal of Software Maintenance: Research
and Practice 7, 1 (1995).
[35] WITTEN, I. H., AND FRANK, E. Data Mining: Practical Machine
Learning Tools and Techniques. Morgan Kaufmann, 2005.
[36] XIE, T., AND NOTKIN, D. Checking Inside the Black Box: Regression
Testing Based on Value Spectra Differences. In ICSM (2004).
[37] ZAMFIR, C., AND CANDEA, G. Execution Synthesis: A Technique for
Automated Software Debugging. In Eurosys (2010).
[38] ZELLER, A. Yesterday, my program worked. today it does not. why?
In ESEC (1999).
[39] ZELLER, A. Isolating Cause-Effect Chains from Computer Programs.
In FSE (2002).
